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The social, cosmopolitanism
and beyond
MICHAEL SCHILLMEIER
ABSTRACT
First, this article will outline the metaphysics of ‘the social’ that implic-
itly and explicitly connects the work of classical and contemporary
cosmopolitan sociologists as different as Durkheim, Weber, Beck and
Luhmann. In a second step, I will show that the cosmopolitan outlook
of classical sociology is driven by exclusive differences. In understand-
ing human affairs, both classical sociology and contemporary cosmo-
politan sociology reflect a very modernist outlook of epistemological,
conceptual, methodological and disciplinary rigour that separates the
cultural sphere from the natural objects of concern. I will suggest that
classical sociology – in order to be cosmopolitan – is forced (1) to
exclude non-social and non-human objects as part of its conceptual and
methodological rigour, and (2) consequently and methodologically to
rule out the non-social and the non-human. Cosmopolitan sociology
imagines ‘the social’ as a global, universal explanatory device to conceive
and describe the non-social and non-human. In a third and final step
the article draws upon the work of the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde
and offers a possible alternative to the modernist social and cultural
other-logics of social sciences. It argues for a inclusive conception of
‘the social’ that gives the non-social and non-human a cosmopolitan
voice as well.
Key words classical sociology, cosmopolitanism, nature/culture,
the social, Gabriel Tarde
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1 THE OTHER-LOGICS OF COSMOPOLITAN
SOCIOLOGY AND ITS LIMITS
In contemporary social studies, the question concerning both the limits of
the object of enquiry and also the limits of social reasoning itself plays a
dominant role. Central to such ‘boundary-discourses’ are socio-political and
cultural processes of societies-in-the-making which are questioning and
altering the (b)orders of social relations (Rumford, 2006a, 2006b). Currently,
the debates about a possible new, ‘cosmopolitan’ framework of sociological
investigation play a considerable role in visualizing the relevance of those
contested boundaries (Beck and Sznaider, 2006). According to Ulrich Beck
(2006), classical social scientific methodologies, theories and research agendas
construct and in turn depend on the metaphysics of societies-as-nation-
states. Beck argues that such a ‘methodological nationalism’ is a relic of 19th-
century societal logics that were dominated by the ‘either . . . or’ of boundary
politics (Beck, 1997). The latter produces ‘exclusive differences’, i.e. clear
and distinct limits between what is culturally normal(ized) and what is not.
Defined by the logics of the ‘either . . . or’, identities exclude each other to
grant and sustain their lexical boundaries. However, as Beck and others
argue, current transnational processes visualize new forms of network-like
organizations, multiple belongings and hybrid identity formations that
cannot be addressed adequately by the logics of exclusive differences (Axford,
2006; Beck, 2007; Urry, 2000).
These dynamics visualize a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ (Beck and Sznaider,
2006) necessitating a conceptual reorientation toward a cosmopolitan outlook
of sociological reasoning. A cosmopolitan view unfolds the logic of ‘inclusive
differences’ (Beck, 2006; Beck and Grande, 2006) that brings to the fore the
global demand of inclusion and not exclusion of the cultural other. Such
inclusive dynamics stipulate a cosmopolitan reframing of social enquiry. It
enables comprehending the global transgression of traditional (b)orders
precisely as a process of connecting and acknowledging the heterogeneity
and difference of the cultural other instead of separating off exclusive socio-
cultural spaces that fails to recognize the interdependency and interconnect-
edness of cultural otherness (cf. Appiah, 2006; Cheah and Robbins, 1998).
It is not my intention to discuss whether the claim that classical sociology
is performing a ‘methodological nationalism’ is feasible or not. Having said
this, I do agree with Beck and others that it is more than obvious that current
sociological concepts and research agendas have to update their modes of
description in order to describe adequately contemporary societal change.
Concepts of new cosmopolitanism, then, can be understood as historically
updated, i.e. late 20th and early 21st sociological concepts of social change
that face a globalized world that is the effect of transnational processes and
structures. Following such a reading, the difference between classical and
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cosmopolitan sociology is given by historical changes of globalization that
necessitate a social ontology of transnational cultural differences that concep-
tually and methodologically includes the relatedness of otherness instead of its
exclusion and separation. Beck’s account of inclusive differences and all forms
of the new cosmopolitanism can be understood primarily as attempts to revise
the conceptual architecture of social theories of change and the related per-
spective and imagination of the human condition within a globalizing world.
Following from that, contemporary social sciences are well advised to
imagine transnational realities and hence a cosmopolitan outlook that unfolds
a sense of inclusive differences of cultural otherness. As I will argue, classical
sociological thought is already well prepared to do so. I will show that
classical sociology, despite its critics, has always been cosmopolitan – albeit
not transnational.1 Clearly the metaphysics of exclusive perspectives and
societies-as-nation-states (‘methodological nationalism’) is outdated and this
is precisely what brings to the fore the very strength of classical sociology –
the metaphysics of the social (‘methodological sociologism’). The very critique
provided by social metaphysics has been giving sociology a cosmopolitan
outlook, dating back to its very institutional inauguration by Durkheim,
Mauss, Weber, Simmel, as well its contemporaries like Beck, Luhmann and
many other prominent figures of social thought.
Classical cosmopolitan sociology – so my argument goes – is concerned
with a universal framework of ‘the social’ that questions the metaphysics
of the single nature, i.e. the cosmos of things, their territories and borders
(cf. Chernilo, 2007). Social sciences have always been cosmopolitan given the
methodological and conceptual interest in ‘the social’ that unfolds an
explanatory space of human affairs provided by the exclusive difference
between societal/cultural relations and natural laws. Such a space opens up
the possibilities for what can be called ‘other-wise-ness’. Other-wise-ness
means: (1) human affairs are not merely caused by natural laws and accord-
ingly can be thought of otherwise, and (2) the social space of human affairs
welcomes conceptually and methodologically the cultural other, it unfolds
what I like to call an other-logics of human affairs.
My first step will be to outline – briefly and only in a more or less prelim-
inary way – the metaphysics of ‘the social’ that implicitly and explicitly
connects the work of classical and contemporary cosmopolitan sociologists
as different as Durkheim, Weber, Beck and Luhmann. In a second step,
however, I will show that the cosmopolitan outlook of classical sociology is
driven by exclusive differences. In understanding human affairs, classical
and contemporary cosmopolitan sociology reflects a very modernist outlook
of epistemological, conceptual, methodological and disciplinary rigour that
separates the cultural sphere from the natural objects of concern. I will
suggest that classical sociology and contemporary sociology – in order to be
cosmopolitan – are forced to
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1 exclude non-social and non-human objects as part of their conceptual and
methodological rigour, and
2 consequently and methodologically rule out the non-social and the non-
human. Cosmopolitan sociology imagines ‘the social’ as a global, universal
explanatory device to conceive and describe the non-social and non-human.
In a third, highly preliminary step I will try to revise the modernist social
and cultural other-logics of social sciences. To do so, I will draw upon the
work of the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde. Tarde offers – so my argument
goes – an alternative, that is a cosmo-logical reading of the other-logics of ‘the
social’. He argues for an inclusive conception of ‘the social’ that radically
differs from the various versions of an exclusivist perspective of ‘the social’
provided by classical cosmopolitan sociology. For Tarde, ‘the social’ is not
the explanatory device to describe and make sense of the non-social and non-
human. Rather, the social remains contingent, open and to be explained by
the very associations of ‘hybrid acts’ that connect the human and non-human.
Thus, Tarde’s sociology circumscribes an early form of what Bruno Latour
and others call a ‘sociology of translation’ (Callon, 1986, 1991; Latour, 2005)
which imagines the social as constantly being maintained but also ‘cosmo-
politized’ (Schillmeier, 2008a, 2008b; Schillmeier and Pohler, 2006), that is,
disrupted, questioned and altered by its association with the non-social
(individual, non-human, etc.) other.
The social, then, can be understood as the effect of inclusive differences
that highlight the heterogeneity of societal processes beyond the classical
cosmopolitan division between nature and culture. Moreover, Tarde’s account
appears so interesting for contemporary social sciences since he proposes a
theory of circulation, propagation and diffusion of ‘the social’ that is rigor-
ously transnational in its outlook. Tarde’s account unfolds a cosmo-logics of
societal affairs that is transnational but also transsocial. It allows a reflection
upon the condition of human societal affairs as the stabilization and contes-
tation of the more or less fragile orderings of social and non-social, human
and non-human associations that effect the contingent divisions between what
is seen as ‘nature’ and/or ‘culture’.
2 THE UNIVERSALISM OF SOCIAL METHODOLOGY
Since the 19th century, the social sciences have been interested in institu-
tionalizing and professionalizing an independent scientific voice focusing
on the ambivalent and contingent forms of social relations that (dis-)order
human affairs. To be sure, to speak of a voice is misleading to a certain extent.
The social sciences have never been a unified or single project. What makes
the social scientific endeavour intrinsically multiple is the idiosyncratic fact
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that social scientific observation is itself part of the object of concern that is
to be observed: ‘the social’. However, in order to turn the ‘social multiple’
into a methodologically universal, i.e. cosmopolitan framework, sociology
made an effort to demarcate ‘the social’ from ‘the non-social’.
For cosmopolitan sociology, ‘the social’ has a reality of its own – a socio-
logics so to speak – that necessarily includes the cultural other but excludes
the logic of ‘the non-social’ and ‘the non-human’ to gain universal explan-
atory power. Most recently, Brian Turner has circumscribed the methodo-
logical space of the social accordingly.
The social differs from
(1) ‘nature’,
(2) ‘the individual’ and its cognitive concerns, and
(3) ‘commonsense’ knowledge.
(Turner, 2006: 134–5)
Only when ‘the social’ attains its own conceptual and methodological space
and accordingly does not blend into physiological or biological orders or
appears to be mere opinion2 is it observable and analysable by social scien-
tists. Methodologically speaking, the societal relevance of brains, individual
bodies, natural things and artefacts is the effect of nothing but social relations
of human organization that attach social relevance to mere material relations.
Within the methodology of the social there are no non-social objects of and
for themselves. Such a socio-logics has turned into a colourful variety of
highly different concepts concerning the other-logics of the social. Drawing
upon a highly idiosyncratic selection of such accounts I will outline the
symptomatic traces left by classical cosmopolitan sociology.
ÉMILE DURKHEIM
Following the methodology of ‘the social’, the social object is no essence, no
substance and no ahistorical or natural thing detached from societal affairs,
but a relational and emergent effect of human practices. Émile Durkheim has
outlined a quite remarkable methodology of the emergence of the social
(Durkheim, 1938). First of all, Durkheim stresses that social objects pre-
suppose non-social entities. Individual human minds and bodies living within
an environment of bio-physiological conditions make human life possible
and durable in the first place (ibid.; cf. Luhmann, 1996: 115). However, human
interactions disclose and delimit an emergent space that is more than just the
association of psyches, biological relations, physiological affinities, material
things and embodied individuals. For Durkheim, the social realm represents
a reality sui generis. Accordingly, it is the ‘inner social milieu’ that frames the
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self-enclosed space of the social that limits sociology’s ‘specific competence’
that differs, for example, from psychology or biology (Durkheim, 1938).
Durkheim argues that
. . . a psychological education, even more than a biological one, consti-
tutes a necessary preparation for a sociologist. But it can only be of
service to him if, once he has acquired it, he frees himself from it, going
beyond it by adding a specifically sociological education. He must give
up making psychology in some way the focal point of his operations,
the point of departure to which he must always return after his adven-
turous incursions into the social world. He must establish himself at
the very heart of social facts in order to observe and confront them
totally, without any mediating factor, while calling upon the science of
the individual only for a general preparation and, if needs be, for useful
suggestions. (Durkheim, 1982[1895]: 135; emphasis added)
Hence, paradoxically, ‘the social’ circumscribes a collective ‘inner space’ that
– since it is without any mediating factor – is exterior to individual minds and
the natural materiality of their actions (cf. Gasché, 1973). Such social exteri-
ority then is related and non-related to the materiality of individual actions.
But only after the nature of individual concerns is abstracted from the global,
universal inner space of the methodological, do the conceptual merits of ‘the
social’ become visible. Thus, in order to grant universal explanatory power to
the social space, Durkheim necessarily has to abstract from humans (psyches)
and their individual concerns as well as from their individual, embodied and
material relations. Durkheim stresses:
It is always a question of discovering the general law of sociality. Since
they are social, all the facts studied by the separate social sciences
supposedly have a common character, and the subject of sociology is
the social fact in abstraction. (Durkheim in Tarde, 1969: 137)
This complex process of abstraction, then, grants the auto-logics of the social
as a global, i.e. universal and self-explanatory methodological framework. It
is the general ‘flexibility, freedom and contingence’ of ‘enlightened’ social
objects that reveal the difference to the nature of individual things and their
pure material existence. Although extensive, the following passage by
Durkheim makes this point very clear:
Individualistic sociology is only applying the old principles of materi-
alistic metaphysics to social life. . . . The whole is only formed by the
grouping of the parts, and these groupings do not take place suddenly
as the result of a miracle. There is an infinite series of intermediaries
between the state of pure isolation and the completed state of associ-
ation. . . . But as the association is formed it gives birth to phenomena
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which are not derived directly from the nature of the associated
elements, and the more elements involved and the more powerful their
synthesis, the more marked is this partial independence. No doubt it is
this that accounts for the flexibility, freedom and contingence that the
superior forms of reality show in comparison with the lower forms in
which they are rooted. In fact, when a way of doing or being depends
from a whole without depending immediately from the parts which
compose that whole, it enjoys, as a result of this diffusion, a ubiquity
which to a certain extent frees it. As it is not fixed to a particular point
in space, it is not bound by too narrowly limited conditions of exist-
ence. If some cause induces a variation, that variation will encounter
less resistance and will come into existence more easily because it has,
in a way, a greater scope for movement. If certain of the parts reject it,
certain others will form the basis (point d’appui) necessary for the new
arrangement without, for all that, being obliged to rearrange themselves.
(Durkheim, 1953: 29–30)
Hence, the very fact that the social is more than the discourse about indi-
vidual, material things is significant for Durkheim’s strategy of delimiting the
scientific autonomy of the methodology of the social.3 Obviously, Durkheim’s
quest for a social methodology translates the Kantian humanistic idea into
a methodological framework of social facts (cf. Kant, 1977). Like Kant,
Durkheim was interested in simultaneously linking and differentiating the
realms of enlightened human nature and nature’s laws. Moreover, Durkheim
(like Kant) was fascinated by the power of methodological abstraction: ‘When
the individual has been eliminated, society alone remains. We must, then,
seek the explanation of social life in the nature of society itself.’ (Durkheim,
1938: 102)
Such an exclusivist perspective enabled Durkheim to draw self-limiting,
conceptual boundaries in order to gain a scientific voice of and for itself, a
voice that speaks about ‘a specific reality which has its own characteristics’.
(Durkheim, 1938: 103). Only under these circumstances does the method-
ology of the social not fall back into the realm of naturalism and psycho-
logical individualism, and is able to gain an autonomous scientific voice instead
(Durkheim, 1938). Only such a space that remains related but unmediated
by the other (the individual, the physiological, the biological) is seen truly
and scientifically as the exclusivity of social space that – for Durkheim –
unfolds its reality that is more complex than non-social realities.
MAX WEBER
For Max Weber the notion of ‘the social’ as ‘the relation between humans’
(Weber, 1951: 165) gets its meaning by and through ‘concrete contemporary
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problems [Gegenwartsprobleme]’ (ibid.). Max Weber’s cosmopolitan under-
standing of ‘the social’ systematically outlines the difference between bounded
matters of facts (nature) and fluid matters of concepts (culture) (ibid.: 165–6).
Max Weber stresses:
It is not the ‘material’ [sachlichen] interconnectedness of ‘things’ [Dingen]
but the conceptual [gedanklichen] interconnectedness of problems that
defines the scope of the various sciences. A new ‘science’ emerges where
new problems are pursued by new methods, and truths are thereby dis-
covered which open up significant points of view. It is now no accident
that the term ‘the social’, which seems to have quite a general meaning,
turns out to have, as soon as one carefully examines its application, a
specifically coloured though often indefinite meaning. Its ‘generality’
rests on nothing but its ambiguity. It provides, when taken in its ‘general’
meaning, no specific point of view, from which the significance of given
elements of culture can be analyzed. (Weber, 1951: 166–7)4
For Max Weber, social sciences are ‘sciences of the concrete present’ [Wirk-
lichkeitswissenschaften] that reflect on the interdependencies of highly indi-
vidual social cultural life, its conditions, realities, relations, specificities and
cultural meaning that actualize and perish through time (Weber, 1951: 170ff.).
Extending Kant’s humanistic critique through the lenses of culture, causal
relations that make up the laws of nature or cognitive processes become a
‘question of ascription [Zurechnungsfrage] from the standpoint of man’ (ibid.:
180), that is, a question of Verstehen through relived experience. Ascription
and human position give meaning to the ‘meaningless infinity of world
affairs’ (ibid.: 180); they attach a specific cultural meaning to the natural flow
of things. Consequently, individuals and nature alike can be understood as a
universal achievement of individual attachment of cultural meaning [Kultur-
bedeutung], i.e. as the (unintended) consequences of the plurality of the speci-
ficity of human relations and not the relationship of essences or naturally given
objects (ibid.).
Following the Weberian legacy, it is precisely the historical flow and social
fluidity of things that names a major insight provided by the socio-logics of
otherness. It is the culturally attributed dimension of the limits of ‘the social’
that makes their boundaries fluid. The boundaries of social phenomena are
fluid since they reflect historical changes and – in principle – allow the un-
limited possibilities of contested cultural translations of factual relations of
things to unfold. The cultural meaning visualizes the possibilities of other-
ness. Fluidity in Weber’s sense also refers to the multiple scales (interaction,
organization, society) of cultural translations, which by definition exceed the
problems of territorially demarcated entities (Weber, 1951). For Weber, contes-
tation, uncertainty and vagueness define the general meaning of ‘the social’.
The methodology of the social, then, does not circumscribe a scientific ‘object’
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but its other, i.e. its ‘“subjective” conditions’ [subjektive Voraussetzungen]
(ibid.: 182).
The latter is much too fluid, vague and ambiguous to be standardized and
objectified even by general social science (Weber, 1973: 206). From a method-
ology of the social, it is necessary to remain within a highly specialized and
one-sided focus on societal problems, be they economical, political, religious,
scientific, etc. Weber’s perspective of the social questions the assumption that
there is such a thing as the social science or the society. Rather, societal
problems embrace specific societal forms [Vergesellschaftungsformen]. It is
precisely the general and universal methodological conceptualization of the
social that does not outline a container model of social relations, but the con-
tingency and fluidity of its individual cultural and historical conduct. Obvi-
ously, from a Weberian point of view, the ‘nation-state’ doesn’t appear as a
natural object but as a culturally specific, historically changing and socially
contested ‘object’. In that sense, new cosmopolitanism tackles changes of the
cultural meaning of nation-states by giving it a transnational outlook. From
this it follows that the limits of space as outlined by the methodological
sociologism of classical sociology cannot be imagined as geographical borders
or geometrical lines. Rather, in a precise sense of the term, the space of ‘the
social’ or ‘the cultural’ is boundary. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger
clarifies such a relation between space and boundary very lucidly:
A space is something that has been made room for, something that is
cleared and free, namely within a boundary, Greek peras. A boundary
is not that which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the
boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. (Heidegger,
1971: 154)
With this in mind, there is nothing but ‘the social’ precisely because what
the social is remains open, contested, multiple, fluid, etc. It is the exclusive,
universally applicable difference of ‘the viewpoint of “the social”’ as ‘the
relation between humans’, which actualizes the methodological rigour of the
social and liberates it from the metaphysics of merely materialistic or natur-
alistic relations of societal phenomena (cf. Castoriadis, 1990; Luhmann, 1998).
Again we find a strong relation of individual and social concerns, which turn
mere natural objects and facts into socio-cultural ‘concerns’. Again such a
relationship is related but unmediated by the non-cultural other. The non-
cultural other only gains its voice through culture.
Although completely different in their outlook, the Durkheimian method-
ology and the Weberian methodology of the social share a cosmopolitan
perspective precisely since both accounts unfold a self-referential methodo-
logical space that constructs and explains otherness instead of taking it for
granted as a naturally appearing other. The specificity of socio-logical space
(Durkheim) and its fluidity (Weber) is given precisely by the contested nature
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of the boundaries of social objects. Since it de-ontologizes the relationship of
objects, the methodology of the social is cosmopolitan through and through.
Still, the cosmopolitanism of classical sociology includes the possibility of
things being other but only if it frees and differentiates social space from
natural laws. The space of the social is its own effect. The socio-logics gains
its limits – its other(s) – by the auto-logics of the social. The social adds
complexity to the description of mere natural objects.
NIKLAS LUHMANN
In the same vein, the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann argues for a
universal methodology of the social when he distinguishes between ‘first-order
observations’ and ‘second-order observations’ (Luhmann, 1998). Luhmann
unfolds a social constructivist methodology that necessarily moves away from
a methodology of objects (given by first-order observations) to a methodol-
ogy of multicontextual meanings (given by second-order observations).
Luhmann stresses that – historically speaking – this shift is fostered by the
invention of the printing press and subsequently visualizes the transform-
ation from tradition to modernity (ibid.). According to Luhmann, the very
‘modernity’ of ‘the social’ as ‘second-order observations’ has tremendous
effects on understanding societal reality:
It will create a constructivist understanding of reality that takes into
consideration that first-order observers are concerned not with construc-
tions but rather with objects. . . . Observations of the first order use
distinctions as a schema but do not yet create a contingency for the
observer himself. The distinction is postulated but not designated in the
designation. . . . Only observations of second order provide grounds
for including contingency in meaning and perhaps reflecting it concep-
tually. Observations of the second order are observations of observa-
tions. . . . Everything becomes contingent whenever what is observed
depends on who is being observed. (Luhmann, 1998: 39, 48)
Such typically modernist semantics of observation visualize the very specific
‘object’ of sociological methodology as part of the operation of what is
observed. Luhmann radicalizes the Kantian theory of human (self-)observa-
tion by pluralizing the uniform human rationality given by Kant’s system.
Following Luhmann, scientific investigation becomes visible as a social
process itself, which neither discovers the reality of things nor is ruled by
human rationality. Rather, the very societal reality is enacted by social means
of observation/description that cannot be reduced by or into a single nature/
rationality. Functional differentiation of societal subsystems is the key argu-
ment in order to address the very modern form of social ‘communication’.5
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It refers to different auto-logics (political, economical, scientific, etc.) that
configure the multiplicity of social forms of rationalities transcending the
possibility of a single and hegemonic view from which society can thoroughly
be viewed – human rationality included.
Luhmann’s logic of second-order observation unfolds a circular, i.e. uni-
versalistic, argumentation that dominates all cosmopolitan methodologies of
the social – no matter how differently they are conceived. Only on the social
level do societal objects gain a non-objectified state of being. In other words,
social objects remain contingent, but only if understood globally as social
constructions. Hence, Luhmann’s and all other cosmopolitan methodologies
of the social reiterate the modernist divide between culture and nature by and
through the mode of exclusive differences: either we engage in a methodol-
ogy of observing ‘objects’ or we are interested in a methodology of ‘the social’.
Luhmann’s radical formalist methodology of the social gives 19th-century
cosmopolitan sociology a 20th-century ‘cybernetic’ outlook of second-order
observations (von Foerster, 2002). Reflecting processes of globalization,
Luhmann’s account is an historically updated and theoretically radicalized
version of 19th-century functional sociology. For Luhmann, the sociological
interests are also not limited to the ‘nation-state’ but refer to ‘world-society’
affairs that take into account the worldwide connectivity and its effects as
they are enabled by new forms of communication technologies and practices
(Luhmann, 1997).
Let me summarize: cosmopolitanism begins where nature ends, and nature
ends where the human, namely, social, nature of things becomes visible. The
methodological enquiry into the human/social nature of things opens up an
exclusive space that frees social science from the constraints of natural enact-
ment. Socio-logics is auto-logics: this is the grand narrative of cosmopolitan-
ism. Moreover, the methodology of the social completes and demystifies at
the same time a Kantian humanist cosmopolitanism by putting it on social
grounds. For cosmopolitan sociology, non-social matters of concern remain
necessarily outside the cosmopolitan view since no conceptual outside is
conceivable. The methodology of the social is self-referential, all-inclusive,
universal. This means that sociological cosmopolitanism conceives the dis-
tinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the non-social’ as a social or cultural con-
struction. Such a process cannot be explained by the laws of nature or by
individual mental acts (rational thinking), physiological acts (sensory percep-
tion) and pure intuition. They all remain methodologically outside the social
field and can only be understood and/or explained by the social itself.
It has been the cosmopolitan methodology of the social (socio-logics as
auto-logics) that has led classical sociology to become a professional disci-
pline. It marks a very modernist understanding of disciplinary professional-
ization. ‘Each profession’, as the philosopher of science Alfred N. Whitehead
critically noted in 1925, ‘makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove.
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Now to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of
abstractions. The . . . abstraction abstracts from something to which no further
attention is paid’ (Whitehead, 1967: 197). Indeed, cosmopolitan sociology
performs the global explanatory isomorphism of the social by abstracting
from the non-human and non-social matter of concerns (Latour, 2005).
Moreover, Whitehead also stresses that professionalization bears the danger
of self-immunization. And indeed: the universalism of the methodology of
the social has not only helped to professionalize sociology, it has also closed
off the social perspective from other perspectives: either one defends the global
explanatory power of the social and relates to ‘a subset of the total universe of
explanations that are in some broad and general sense “sociological”’ (Turner,
2006: 137) or one is outside sociological reasoning and naturalizes, biologizes,
psychologizes or objectifies the world by confusing causal (material) object
relations (nature) with social effects (society).
I agree with Bruno Latour that such a strategy of methodological sociol-
ogism ‘nurtures in its bosom the most archaic and magical ghost: a self-
generated, self-explicative society’ (Latour, 2005: 86). The very bifurcation
between the nature and culture of objects has been implicitly accepted as
the quasi-natural explanatory device of sociological enquiries. In doing so,
cosmopolitanism not only conducts a highly modernist division between
social relations and object relations but also denies the possibility of non-
human and non-social object relations to mediate and to ‘object’ to (Stengers,
2000) the global, universal explanatory power of the exclusivist perspective
of the social.
3 BEYOND COSMOPOLITANISM
Cosmopolitan sociology has been a remarkable modernist attempt to give
‘the social’ its own self-referential voice of explanation. In this manner, a
conceptual and methodological space has been opened up that enables it to
reflect and describe the world ‘other-wise’. It is the socio-cultural other that
visualizes the other-logics of human affairs that differs – clare et distincte –
from the logics of mere individual and/or natural laws. Cosmopolitan affairs,
then, appear within a self-enclosed space of the social and only there, exclud-
ing the non-human and non-social from being agents of cosmopolitanism. In
this last section I try to reflect upon how to develop an inclusive methodol-
ogy of the social that gives the non-human and the non-social a cosmopolitan
voice – rather than abstracting from it as classical sociology does. How would
one conceptualize a methodology that is not concerned with delimiting the
social but takes the transgression of the limits of humanness, sociality and
nature as the very focus of its own methodological rigour? How would one
imagine the methodological rigour that considers societal relations as local
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achievements of social and non-social configurations rather than globally
being explained by the social?
Bearing this in mind, I develop some first steps toward such an inclusive
methodology, a methodology of (emerging) natures/cultures that cut across
the big divide between culture and nature as given by classical sociology. Such
a reading introduces a shift from the self-referential cosmopolitan critique of
matters of fact by the socio-cultural other toward an understanding of the
social as the effect of multiple and heterogeneous events of human and non-
human, social and non-social connections (Schillmeier, 2007; Schillmeier and
Pohler, 2006).6 Luckily, such a methodology is already at hand – the work of
Gabriel Tarde – but it has been consequently silenced by the dominance of
the methodological rigour of cosmopolitanism.
GABRIEL TARDE
What makes Tarde’s work so different from classical cosmopolitan sociology
is that it turns the methodology of the social upside down. For Tarde ‘the
social’ has to be explained by its mediation through the non-social and non-
human other. At the end of the 19th century Tarde argued in debates with
his antipode Durkheim that ‘there can only be individual actions and inter-
actions’ (Tarde, 1969[1904 essay]: 140); and it is the very practice of imitation
through which human beings become social beings (Tarde, 1921[1890]). For
Tarde, imitation is the social version of universal laws of repetition. By repe-
tition the cosmological order is gained, maintained and multiplied (Tarde,
1969[1902 essay]: 146). In addition to imitation, two other forms of repetition
exist: biological repetition (heredity) and physical repetition (wave oscilla-
tion). Through imitation, human thinking and acting become different from
merely biological and physical repetitions. Imitation, then, is first and fore-
most an act of difference. In Tarde’s words, it refers to an act of ‘innovation’
and ‘complication’ (ibid.: 147), linking and binding heterogeneous elements,
both human and non-human, through time (e.g. brain cells, minds, people,
groups, organizations, technologies and natural objects).
Hence, according to Tarde, the methodology of the social sciences does
not differ from that of the natural sciences since they all deal with universal
laws, i.e. universal laws of repetition. Still, imitation is the social form of repe-
tition that makes the social sciences different and original. Tarde stresses that
[S]ocieties, no less than the biological world or even the physical world,
present precise repetitions, regular and identical series of acts and
facts. . . . [T]he advantage thus obtained of being able to treat social as
well as natural phenomena scientifically is not purchased at the cost of
any confusion between these two orders of facts, which continue to be
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divided by a clear line of demarcation, nor by the sacrifice of human
personality to the exigencies of a completely naturalist conception of
societies. Seeing things from this angle we can leave aside the vexing
question of free choice . . . (Tarde, 1969[1898 essay]: 89)
Crucially, Tarde is interested in connecting the cosmologies of social and
non-social universal laws, quite contrary to the Kantian legacy of cosmo-
politan sociology as described above that separates nature and human/social
nature (culture) in order to free itself from natural laws. The Tardeian cosmo-
logical methodology stresses the similarities and relatedness of social and
non-social dynamics in order to name the difference, originality and individ-
uality given by the (emergence of) societal modes of ordering. Tarde critically
observed that sociology ‘seeks to be established by itself and for itself’ as given
by methodological sociologism that systematically oversees ‘the profound
unity of universal reality’. According to Tarde, methodological sociologism
expresses ‘a sort of egotism or scientific individualism – useful to some degree,
like all animal or human egotism, but beyond a certain point harmful to the
individual itself’ (Tarde, 1969[1894 essay]: 112).
Following Tarde, whenever an act of imitation itself is imitated, social rela-
tions demarcate their societal identity and belonging. To be sure, for Tarde,
the notion of society does not refer to ‘society’ as a separate conceptual sphere
from ‘nature’ as sociological cosmopolitanism suggests (Tarde, 1999[1893]).
Rather, it indicates the odd relation ‘that everything is society and that all
phenomena are social facts’ [‘que toute chose est une société, que tout phén-
omène est un fait social’] (Tarde, 1999: 58), be they atoms, cells, brains, stars,
living or dead bodies, human beings, etc. A society is always a society of
things be they humans or non-humans. The main characteristic of societies
is primarily the desire to propagate – not to organize; organizing is a means
whose aim is repetition and propagation (Tarde, 1921: 80).
Hence, it is the focus on dissemination and circulation which gives entities
societal stability and durability but also ‘leaves a large share in social destinies
to individual irregularities’ (Tarde, 1969[1902 essay]: 148). Reflecting upon
the social changes at the end of the 19th century, Tarde explains the difference
between organization and propagation by differentiating between ‘the nation’
and ‘human society’. Whereas the nation-state refers to ‘a kind of hyper-
organism’ of interrelated organizations, human society becomes visible as the
parallel ‘denationalization of hundreds of millions of people’. The latter is
the effect achieved by the propagation of ‘socialization’ through new tech-
nologies of mobility and communication, for example (Tarde, 1921: 70–1).
It is important to note that for Tarde, ‘the social’ is primarily a question of
extension and velocity of how local practices circulate, diffuse and become
imitated and not so much the interrelationships between rather abstract
entities such as institutions, organizations and/or nations.7
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Whenever the propagation of individual, non-customary, ‘extra-national’
imitation dominates over mere social imitations or the imitation of the ‘national
idea’ (Tarde 1921: 318–19, 397), local practices become transnationally rele-
vant, questioned, contested and altered. Interestingly enough, Tarde called this
process ‘European equilibrium’. It signifies a constant interchange of cultural
services and borrowings of any kind. The European equilibrium foreshadows
a global way of speeding up activities and acting at a distance that overcomes
the limits of distance from others (ibid.: 398–400). It is the imitation of the
non-familial other which replaces for a given moment the imitation of the
same, the familial and the national. Cosmopolitan realities, then, regularly
occur whenever the imitations of familial, common and institutionalized forms
are satisfied and have achieved their limits.
Tarde sees these realities as the effect of ‘cosmopolitan flooding’ that started
to become visible in the late 19th century. By this, he means the universal
and seemingly limitless multiplication of ‘extra-national’ forms of imitating
cultural otherness (Tarde, 1921: 422). Moreover, he visualizes social science
as being just as cosmopolitan as all the other natural sciences, since imitation
– similar to biological and physical repetition – is a universal natural law.
However, the multiplication of ‘extra-national’ imitation does not mean that
relations with other humans multiply as well (ibid.: 423–4). On the contrary,
the global imitation of otherness as well as any global explanation of it reaches
its limits. In effect, it provides room for ‘the deep and fleeting singularity of
individuals, their way of being, of thinking, of feeling’ (ibid.: 424). It is
precisely the impact of cosmopolitan processes that has radical effects on
understanding societal processes, which are directly linked to individual prac-
tices. Following Tarde, the effects of cosmopolitan processes do not confirm
but question the cosmopolitan conceptualization of the social as a universal
explanatory device given by classical sociology. The social does not appear
as a reality of its own but as the effect of highly multiple assemblages of indi-
vidual singularities that configure and reconfigure societal realities.
Thus, the difference between ‘nationalization’ and ‘socialization’ beauti-
fully describes Tarde’s formula ab interioribus ad exteriora, ‘the general arises
from the individual’ (Tarde, 1969[1898 essay]: 103; cf. Tarde, 1999): every-
thing flows from the individual idea to its social imitation, from the small to
the large, from the local to the global, from one-sidedness to reciprocity, from
the thing to its sign, from the lover to the beloved, and so on. Although our
organizations and nations are globally interrelated, individual practices strive
for a more all-encompassing and faster socialization.
For Tarde’s cosmological project, the complexities lie within the local,
individual practices, whereas global settings and perspectives are just simpli-
fied and standardized versions of local complexity (cf. also Latour, 2002).
Tarde stresses that individual acts are more complex than global social
imitations:
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. . . each of these acts depends not only on the nature of the social fact
but also on the mental and biological constitution of the agent and on
the physical environment, these are types of hybrid acts, socio-psychical
or socio-physical facts with which we [according to Durkheim (author’s
addition)] should no longer sully the scientific purity of the new soci-
ology. (Tarde, 1969[1894 essay]: 117)
Neither does ‘the social’ and ‘cultural’ enact the individual (non-social), nor
does nature enact culture, nor does the macro and global enact the national
and local. Rather, it is the cosmopolitan, universal ‘flooding’ of ‘extra-national’
and ‘extra-social’ practices which draws our methodological attention toward
the heterogeneous and local character of societal relations. Hence, cosmo-
politan realities become visible whenever they question, overflow and alter
the borders of common social orderings.
The very methodological difference that Tarde’s cosmological perspective
suggests is that there is no such unmediated ‘“purely social thing” which by
definition is pure and purged of all individual reality’ (Tarde, 1969[1897
essay]: 225) as Durkheim among others suggested. Rather, only in connec-
tion with individual, non-social elements is the social traceable, sustainable
and changeable. Tarde notes:
It sufficed for me to see that with individual entities, with mental
entities, men assembled together create a social entity by virtue of their
animal or presocial attraction, and that the social thing is distinct from
psychological things, precisely because it is composed of them, because
it is the non-artificial synthesis of them, their true union, their objective
number, and . . . their local aggregate. (Tarde, 1969[1897 essay]: 225)
[W]ithout the individual element the social element is nothing, and there
is nothing, absolutely nothing, in society which does not exist piecemeal
in a state of continual repetition in living individuals and which does
not exist in ancestors of the present individuals. (Tarde, 1969[1894
essay]: 121–2)
Tarde’s objection is directed against any methodological attempt to globalize
one’s own perspective. From the Tardeian perspective, a self-generated and
self-explicative social sphere is nothing but an ‘ontological phantasmagoria’
(Tarde, 1969[1894 essay]) gained by abstraction from individual, hybrid acts.
Current debates on global change and its effects explicate the lesson we can
learn from Tarde’s work. These post-cosmopolitan realities historically visu-
alize the limits of the methodology of cosmopolitanism. Post-cosmopolitan
dynamics address the limits of self-referential socialization (imitation of
imitations) and its transgression by individual, i.e. non-social inventions,
which according to Tarde visualize the universal social law that is nothing
without the non-social (Tarde, 1921, 2000). Invention introduces novelty to
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the societies concerned, which are associated varieties of social, biological and
physical repetition. The social cannot gain and maintain stability nor can it
change its limits without the individuality of the non-social. Hence, from the
perspective of the social, more complexity is introduced only in association
with the non-social. Consequently, it is the connection with the non-social
that questions the global social realm and its universal methodology and
‘articulates’ – as Bruno Latour would say (Latour, 2005) – heterogeneity
instead. On account of this, the act of invention visualizes, questions and trans-
gresses common (and often unquestioned) forms of imitation – including the
imitation of cosmopolitan sociology and its methodology of the social.
Tarde’s account appears so radical since his methodology rigorously ques-
tions (1) the Kantian normative divide between coercive nature and freely
acting human nature, as well as (2) the cosmopolitan methodology of the
social that echoes and completes Kant’s division by separating the social from
merely individual domains. Tarde’s methodology enables an awakening from
the social somnambulism8 of cosmopolitan methodology that explains the
social by itself and for itself. Consequently, Tarde’s view is that the social is
just part – and thus a highly limited and standardized version – of the multi-
plicity of associated and associating humans and non-human entities. Tarde’s
account develops the methodology of heterogeneous ‘becomings’ (Deleuze
and Guattari, 1988; Grosz, 1999; Schillmeier, 2007) of (un-)stable ‘world-
building entelechies’ (Latour, 2002: 128). These material becomings (re-)
connect human society and non-human societies and make societal things
open for public contestation. Cosmopolitan sociology, on the other hand,
addresses humans and non-humans alike through a globally conceived explan-
atory device of the social that explains and constructs the meaningfulness,
the multiplicity and contingency of the individual and non-social. In Tarde’s
methodology, in contrast, ‘the social’ is maintained and altered by the multi-
plicity of individual, hybrid acts, since the individual non-social is as mean-
ingful and multiple as is the social (Tarde, 1969[1902 essay]: 148).
It is the very cosmological solidarity of natures/cultures at the core of
Tarde’s methodology that differs from classical and new cosmopolitanism.
According to new cosmopolitanism, the global, extra-national dimension of
social reality enforces structural demands that re-relate individual, local,
familial and national spheres. According to Beck, global social realities demand
a new ‘grammatical order’ of sociological thought (Beck, 2006; Beck and
Sznaider, 2006). Such a new grammar is meant to be able to speak a new,
historically updated sociological language that enables one to adequately
address the dimension of global change. As much as I agree with Beck’s
interest in renewing a self-sufficient sociology, it looks as if Beck wants to
generate a new grammar of cosmopolitan reality before looking at its vocabu-
lary. Beck’s quest for a new cosmopolitan sociology appears primarily to be
an historically updated form of classical sociological cosmopolitanism as long
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as his inclusive logics leaves out a systematic interrogation of methodologi-
cal sociologism itself. New cosmopolitanism will stop its quest for methodo-
logical renewal at the halfway point if it does not radically question its own
methodological premises that exclude the non-human and non-social other
from having a cosmopolitan voice.
Tarde’s methodology, I suppose, has already achieved what new cosmo-
politanism is striving for. His methodological rigour is able to tackle the pro-
cesses of cosmopolitan changes and processes that question cosmopolitanism.
It is precisely after the cosmopolitan flooding of social realities that ‘the
social’ appears – globally visible! – to be a fragile temporary and local effect
of hybrid individual acts of human and non-human, social and non-social
configurations. The effects of cosmopolitan processes render the universal
explanatory power of the social as temporarily standardized and fragile
versions of a multiplicity of local ‘hybrid acts’ of natures/cultures. Tarde’s
unruly cosmological methodology is not just an historically updated cosmo-
politanism that extends the global explanatory device of the social to global
processes. Rather, it is a universally applicable methodological framework
that focuses on individual and heterogeneous practices of natures/cultures that
make up contingent characteristics of societal processes. Tarde has developed
a methodology of ‘cosmo-political events’ (Schillmeier and Pohler, 2006).
Cosmo-political events and their effects assemble societal practices by relating
human and non-human entities, which in turn stabilize or disrupt, maintain
or alter the cosmos of given modes of social orderings.9
This is Tarde’s sociology of translation with which he criss-crosses and
transgresses the cosmopolitan perspective from the very beginning. The social
cannot explain itself by itself precisely because it is more than an act of bio-
logical or physiological repetition. At the same time the social is strongly
connected to – and methodologically not distinct from – biological and phys-
iological repetitions. Thus, the social cannot be methodologically abstracted
from biological and physiological repetition. Rather, the repetition of ‘extra-
social’ activities enacts the beginning and end of la chose sociale (Tarde, 1921:
86). According to Tarde, it is the principal undecidability between processes
of either logical or extra-logical, familial or extra-familial, national or extra-
national, social or non-social forms of repetition and innovation from which
an inclusive methodology of the dis/continuities of societal change unfolds
(ibid.: 2000).
Tarde’s methodology seems highly attractive if we want to analyse, for
example, how social practices are constantly produced and diffused, main-
tained, questioned and altered by globally circulating and spreading techno-
scientific innovations (e.g. nuclear energy, nanotechnologies, biomedical
and genetic research). His methodology is also useful for reconstructing
and analysing how societal orders are disrupted and changed by natural
disasters and ecological dangers (global climate change, global warming) or
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the migration of (newly emerging) viruses and infectious diseases, etc. Such
processes link human with non-human entities, social imitations with non-
social innovations, and thereby constantly configure and reconfigure the
commonality of societal realities and mobilities (Latour, 2005; Schillmeier,
2007, 2008a; Urry, 2000). These hybrid associations, then, ‘make things public’
and question the commonality and routine of social orderings (Latour and
Weibel, 2005; Schillmeier and Pohler, 2006).
CONCLUSION
As I have tried to show, in contrast to the methodology of cosmopolitan soci-
ology – old and new alike – Tarde is interested in the dynamics of ‘hybrid
acts’. Hybrid acts associate social and non-social, human and non-human
elements in order to confirm or question social (b)orders. I have argued that
his methodology draws upon a cosmological solidarity between oppositional
forces (natures/cultures). Still, for Tarde, social and non-social, human and
non-human are explained in the same terms: difference and repetition. In every
individual act it remains methodologically open whether to adapt the routines
of the social (imitation) or to visualize and transgress the limits of the social
by the non-social (innovation). It is the multiplicity of these local repetitions
and differences that makes up ‘universal variation’, and thus the ‘physiog-
nomies of individual’ characteristics of natures/cultures (Tarde, 2000: 98).
Kantian cosmopolitanism as a mode of exclusivist thinking of the world
as a global human affair – that consequently led to scientific separatism as
fostered by methodological sociologism – was Tardes’ biggest concern.
Instead, he encourages a ‘philosophical ethos’ (Foucault, 1984) of constant
transliminal movement that highlights the transgression of social and non-
social methodologies alike. It demystifies the otherness of ‘the social’ as a
reality of its own set in place in order to free us from the external forces of
nature – as cosmopolitanism would have it. Further, his perspective unfolds
a universal methodology of openness where the possibility of transgressing
the limits of sociality and humanness is part and parcel of tackling the changing
dynamics of societal realities of natures/cultures. He thereby avoids (un-)
doing the bifurcation between society and nature, which is the basic prin-
ciple of cosmopolitan methodology – old and new alike. We just have to look
at the current experience of global changes that question ‘territoriality’ as the
dominating strategy of societal (b)orders. It reveals more than ever the recon-
figuration of the limits of nature/cultures involved. Tarde’s methodological
alternative is a highly valid option to address the multiplicity and hetero-
geneity of these changes and how they question and alter ‘the social’.
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NOTES
1 Obviously classical sociology lacked the transnational perspective since societal
change was very much related to inter-national connectedness whereby nation-
states played a much more dominating role than in contemporary relations.
2 This explains the importance of the ‘para-dox’ within social imagination (cf.
Luhmann, 1998) that is meant to differ from mere opinion (doxa).
3 Since the 19th century, the methodological discourse of the social sciences gains
its own exclusive voice not in relation to the objects observed, but in comparison
with other discourses like those of the natural sciences, philosophy, psychology,
physiology and biology, etc. Through comparison with other methodologies of
observation, the exclusive difference of the methodology of the social becomes
evident. For a different view see Law (2004).
4 My translation.
5 The concept of communication tries to indicate the exclusive cosmopolitan social
realm of ‘seeing’ things in endlessly different manners. Communication processes,
then, neither ‘think’ as human beings do, nor do they feel or sense, they only
communicate (e.g. through language, writing, etc.) and by doing so, they make
things societally relevant. See Luhmann (1995).
6 This is also the main motivation of the different versions of a ‘sociology of trans-
lation’ alias Actor-Network-Theory, which advocates an explanatory ‘principle
of symmetry’ where human and non-humans, society and nature are not seen as
separate entities, but as circulating and thus articulating ‘hybrid acts’ of Society/
Nature. See, for instance, Callon (1986, 1998), Hetherington and Munro (1997),
Latour (1999, 2002, 2005), Law and Hassard (1999), Mol (2002), Schillmeier
(2007, 2008a, 2008b), Schillmeier and Pohler (2006). 
7 Current studies on practices, mobilities, assemblages and complex (b)ordering
visualize a Tardeian mood of social studies inasmuch as they are not so much
interested in a Durkheimian ‘division of labour’ as in the multiplicities of the
‘labour of division’ (Hetherington and Munro, 1997). See also Axford (2006);
Law (2002, 2004); Lee (1998); Mol (2002); Urry (2000). 
8 Tarde describes perfect imitation as social somnambulism (Tarde, 1921).
9 Whenever given social orderings are successfully imitated (like extra-national, i.e.
cosmopolitan, practices) they are not cosmo-political but refer to institutionalized,
i.e. imitated, forms of cosmopolitanism. Yet, new nationalisms can be cosmo-
political as soon as they question and alter transnational configurations.
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